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Does FDI reduce poverty? The Indian cases 
 
Meera Tiwari 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Since the post reform period in the mid 1990s India has experienced aggregate 
economic growth of 5-8% per year and emerged as a global player along with China. 
Unlike China though, where the economic liberalisation began in 1979, India’s reform 
process was launched in response to the fiscal and balance of payment crisis in 
1991. The appropriateness of the inward looking policy stance based on import 
substitution and controlled economy adopted since her independence in 1947, had 
begun to be questioned in the 1980s. The limitations of the model over the years in 
all aspects of the economy led to the near collapse of the fiscal and the monetary 
systems by the beginning of the 1990s. The reforms were therefore wide ranging, 
targeting trade, industry and the financial sectori
 The reforms included lifting of the restrictive approach to Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the country. What are the impacts, if any, of the progressively 
more liberal FDI regime on the income and social poverty in the country?  
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) – the main drivers of FDI, have been gaining 
increasing entry into the tertiary and the manufacturing sectors of the country. India’s 
rapid entry as a global player and continuing expansion of her economy are notable 
achievements. But what has been the impact of TNC expansion on the poverty 
levels? There has been some progress in human development, though far less than 
needed. India remains the home to the largest number of the world’s poor. More than 
a third (36%) - 433 million - of the world’s dollar-a-day poor (1993 PPP line) reside in 
India, a fifth of the world’s children not in primary school are in India and India is 
home to a quarter of the world’s under five year old deaths and a quarter of maternal 
deaths each year.  (Datt and Ravallion, 2002; World Bank, 2001).  
. The opening of the economy 
resulted in a decade of high aggregate growth per year, per capita income growth of 
3-5% a year and a doubling of GDP per capita over the period (PPP, 1985 base 
year, World Bank, 2001). Poverty  – both income and social poverty in the country 
though remains high.  
The chapter explores the much contested linkages between poverty and the 
increasing more liberal FDI regimes. Attention is paid to the FDI inflows to the tertiary 
and the manufacturing sectors in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu respectively. The 
chapter is organised in five sections. An overview of the current debates on FDI and 
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poverty, followed by a brief discussion on the sectoral distribution of FDI and 
engagement with domestic economy is presented in section 2. Section 3 discusses 
the FDI trends in India, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, identifying special features and 
the sectoral focus of FDI in each state. The links between the types of FDI and 
poverty within the context of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are explored through a 
conceptual model of domestic human capital mapping in section 4. The conclusions 
of the chapter are presented in section 5.  
 
2. FDI and links with poverty 
 
This section provides an overview of the current debates on FDI and poverty. The 
discussions form the basis for the conceptual framework of how different sectors with 
FDI inflows engage with the domestic human capital and the spillovers that emerge 
in section 3. In addition it provides the foundations to examine the types of FDI and 
impacts on poverty through domestic linkages within the context of Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu explored in section 4.  
 Whether FDI benefits the poor is an issue that remains disputed in the current 
literature. In general, globalisation, of which FDI and trade openness are critical 
drivers, is attributed to poverty reduction in South and East Asia by the pro-
globalisation school. Though as Bardhan (2006) points out, this is more by 
correlation than any robust demonstration of evidence. In the three countries – 
China, Indonesia and India, that show a steep decline in poverty during the onset of 
globalisation between 1981-2001 (Chen and Ravallion, 2004), there are no in-depth 
studies exploring the impact of domestic policy and internal factor changes on 
poverty. Similarly, Bardhan argues that the poor progress of much of Sub-Sahara in 
poverty reduction during the same period could have other causal factors instead of 
simply attributing it to the negative impact of globalisation. Specific conclusions 
regarding the positive impact of trade liberalisation on poverty reduction can be 
drawn from recent works of Dollar and Kraay (2004), Ganuza et. al (2005) and 
Winters (2002) amongst others.  With regards to FDI there is increasing recognition 
that FDI does not by itself lead to development. The studies conducted in the early 
part of this decade fall into two categories.ii The first group draws inclusive findings 
on the positive impact of FDI on poverty reduction. For example, Carkovic and 
Levine (2002) found no causative links between FDI and per capita income. While 
Agenor found no association between FDI and poverty, Milanovic (2002) presented 
similar conclusions for FDI and per capita growth at any level of income. More 
recently, Kamalakanthan and Laurenceson (2005) raise doubts regarding FDI driving 
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income growth in China and India. In the second category, Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
showed a rise of 10-13 percent in the average income with an increase of 1 percent 
FDI over a decade. Soto (2000) put forward similar findings showing that a rise in 
FDI/GNP raises per capita income by 3 percent. These outcomes are much 
contested on the grounds of data comparability and methodological consistency at 
cross-country level. There seems a better correlation between FDI and aggregate 
economic growth as seen, for example, in Balasubramanyam et al. (1999) and 
Lensink and Morrisey (2001). 
There is absence of research on FDI and poverty in the current literature as 
also noted in Sumner (2005). Some areas draw consensus amidst researchers on 
conditions that maybe necessary for FDI to stimulate economic development. These 
are linkages with the local industry and linkages with the local economy (Hansen, 
2004). This is a revival of the debate on linkages – forward and backward-- initiated 
by Hirshman in 1958. According to Hirshman (1958), the pattern of linkages between 
different industries played an important role in domestic development. Later, Mellor 
(1976) examined the role of linkages in the context of the non-farm sector and the 
rural economy to benefit the poor. Both Hirshman and Mellor emphasised the 
involvement of the local resources for either industrialisation or the non-farm sector 
to be beneficial to the local population.  
The current thinking on linkages between FDI and the local industry and 
economy builds on the concept of engaging with the domestic industry, labour 
market and the overall economy. The deeper and more far reaching the spillovers 
from this domestic engagement, the higher the potential to stimulate local 
development. It can be argued here that it is not so much the level of investment per 
se but the level of engagement with the domestic resources – human, physical and 
markets – that acts as a stronger stimulant to the local economy. The point is 
illustrated through a number of FDI driven industries in the African subcontinent, 
China and India. For example, the precious metal mining sector in several African 
countries continues to attract very high levels of FDI with feeble local linkages 
(Larsen et al. 2006) particularly in terms of skilled employment, local industry and 
domestic market. By contrast, the manufacturing sector, which attracts the majority of 
China’s overall FDI (UNCTAD, 2005), is fully integrated into the domestic context. 
Likewise the Information Technology sector in India remains a strong magnet for FDI 
with deep-rooted domestic market linkages.  The FDI – domestic linkage conceptual 
framework can be used to partially explain the much lower FDI linked benefits in the 
African countries as compared with China and India.  
4 
The focus then shifts to examining which type of FDI creates deeper 
connections and stronger integrations with the domestic economy. A significant 
proportion of the FDI to the African countries is in the natural resources – the primary 
sector (UNCTAD, 2005: 43). A parallel can be drawn here with the large amount of 
FDI going into the state of Orissa in India. Orissa attracts the fourth largest FDI flows 
amidst all states in India (Tables 2 and 3) but remains in the cluster of the five most 
backward states (Table 5) – Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and 
Orissa. Orissa has the highest head count index of 47.8 rural and 43.4 urban in the 
country, as well as the second lowest per capita income and one of the lowest HDI in 
the country.  
It can be argued that the natural resources sector led FDI engages with the 
domestic human capital in a way that does not translate into significant improvement 
of the human development indicators for the wider population. The sectoral 
composition of FDI distribution appears to be a critical factor influencing linkages with 
the domestic economy. Conceptually then, FDI in sectors that engage most with the 
domestic resources bear high potential as stimulants to the local economy. Further, it 
is the level of engagement with domestic resources that impacts on the 
multidimensional development indicators. The direct benefits remain via the 
expansion of livelihood opportunities. This in turn though is expected to attract public 
and private sector investment in social sectors – education, health and infrastructure. 
The spillovers from improved social sectors reach the wider population spurring the 
betterment of the overall human capital. Hence, the wider the reach of the sectoral 
engagement with the domestic population is, the more widespread the benefits – 
both direct and indirect—will be.  The poverty reduction impacts of FDI are therefore 
conceptualised via the level of engagement with the local population as noted above.  
The next section examines the FDI trends in the two states – Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka, within the overall trends for India. The discussions then highlight the 
poverty and development contexts of each state.  
 
3. FDI trends in India, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka  
 
The post reform period since the mid 1990s saw the rapid entry of India in the global 
markets, which become the subject of growing debate for the North-South and 
South-South economic configurations. This section draws attention to the increasing 
FDI inflows in the country and the mushrooming of TNCs in Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka. The two states together account for nearly a fifth of the FDI inflows to the 
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country. In recent times, the states appear to be attracting TNCs in two distinct 
sectors.  
As in most developing countries, FDI was viewed with suspicion in the post 
independence period in India. The stiff stance towards FDI in terms of ownership 
restrictions and sectors open, along with the protectionist import substitution oriented 
regime, began to ease in the early 1990s. The poor outcomes of the central planning 
led growth combined with the balance of payment crisis resulted in the near collapse 
of the fiscal system in 1991. This initiated the liberalisation process and the opening 
of the economy. The reforms ushered in deregulation, lifting of quotas and tariffs and 
a shift towards an export-led growth. Though a slow start in opening the country to 
FDI, the FDI regime is increasingly becoming more liberal. While India’s net FDI 
inflows dwarf when compared to its economic rival China as shown in Table 1, there 
has been a consistent year on growth and expansion of FDI within the country. 
Furthermore, the subject has generated a rich debate within the research and the 
policy makers’ community (Sachs et. al., 2000, Shand and Bhide, 2001, Bajpai, 
2002, GoI, 2002, Singh and Srinivasan, 2004, Hansen, 2004, Kamalakanthan and 
Laurenceson, 2005).    
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
The main areas impeding the country’s efforts to expanding the FDI inflows 
identified in the mentioned studies are: poor FDI approvals to actual ratio - less than 
25 % of approvals are translated to actual FDI, chronic infrastructure difficulties 
especially regarding unreliable power coupled with poor roads network, serious 
governance issues, competitiveness and labour productivity.  
 FDI trends (Tables 2 and 3) for the different states appear to follow the 
overall regional variations in the development indicators shown in Table 5, though 
with some definite outliers. Kerala, the state with the highest HDI ranking in the 
country has the fourth lowest per capita FDI while Orissa attracts relatively high FDI 
but has poor development indicators (www.indiastat.com). A partial explanation is 
offered in Siddharthan (2006). The arguments though fall short of a detailed 
academic treatment of the causative and enabling factors for the outliers – perhaps 
because the study focuses on examining the regional FDI trends within India and 
China. A more in-depth understanding of the contrasting FDI and poverty trends in 
both states may further the FDI and poverty debate.  
 
[Insert tables 2 and 3] 
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The outcomes have far reaching impact at both the domestic level and for 
other developing countries. The issue therefore needs to be explored in detail. The 
overall expansion of FDI in India indicates clustering around states with a high reform 
agenda such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in the south, 
Maharashtra and Gujarat in the west and more recently Delhi in the north of the 
country. Tamil Nadu and Karnataka together account for nearly a fifth of the country’s 
FDI inflows. Karnataka’s FDI is focussed in the tertiary sector through software and 
the ICT industries. Tamil Nadu on the other hand is emerging as an attractive 
destination for TNCs in the manufacturing sector.  
The manufacturing sector in Tamil Nadu is dominated by the auto-industry 
and the textile knitwear industry. The knitwear industry cluster around Tirupur in 
Tamil Nadu accounts for three quarters of the country’s knitwear exports. The cluster 
has expanded within the typical characteristic trajectory of the Indian textile and 
apparel industry. The key features as argued in Tewari (2005) being (a) global 
integration driven by competitive domestic firms, (b) presence of an existing strong 
domestic cotton fibre and textile base, (c) deregulation of the domestic textile and 
apparel industry in the mid 1980s which initiated the spurt in exports, (d) 
consolidation of the export strategy in the post liberalisation period after 1991 and (e) 
the absence of any significant inflows of FDI into expanding the export growth of the 
sector in recent years. The last feature is in stark contrast with the apparel exports 
trends in China where over a third of the apparel export firms are FDI driven. 
Similarly, other major exporters such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius and 
Mexico are also dominated by foreign-invested capital firms (UNCTAD, 2005). India’s 
textile and apparel exports industry on the other hand has a strong presence of the 
domestic firms. Furthermore, between1991-2004 the textile sector received a mere 
1% of India’s cumulative FDI compared with 9% in the auto industry (GoI, 2005, 
Tewari, 2005).  
The auto-industry in Tamil Nadu has a different growth trajectory to the textile 
and apparel industry. Often referred to as the ‘Detroit of India’, the engineering-based 
industry in Tamil Nadu can be traced back to the late ‘40s and early ‘50s.  The first 
auto component producer - India Pistons was established in 1949 in collaboration 
with a British engineering group. This laid the foundation for Tamil Nadu emerging as 
the country’s hub for auto-component production. Functioning within the restrictive 
Import Substitution (ISI) framework until the early ‘80s, it catered mostly to the 
domestic market for heavy vehicles such as trucks, jeeps, tractors and buses. While 
innovation and technology development were limited, the ISI fostered skilled and 
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technical workforce in the regioniii
The IT cluster in Karnataka is the focus of the IT industry in India. The three 
southern states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh dominate the ICT 
industry in terms of the human capital
. The transformation of the auto industry started in 
the ‘80s with the arrival of Suzuki to set up a joint venture with the Government of 
India – Maruti Udyog Ltd. The modernisation of the industry was well under way after 
the liberalisation in 1991 with 16 international auto-makers establishing joint ventures 
and/or subsidiaries. The auto-industry nationally mushroomed in 3 main clusters with 
Tamil Nadu as the focal point of the Southern cluster hosting Ford, Mitsubishi and 
Hyundai. While the three assemblers have adopted very different approaches, 
linkages with the local supplier network are strong and remain the overarching 
feature for all three as pointed in Tewari (2001). The unique feature of the industry is 
its reliance on a number of relatively small domestic suppliers. Okada (2004) notes 
that a combination of India’s ISI stance during 1950s through the 1970s and 
transformations within the New Economic Policy framework since 1991 led to the 
following outcomes. First, the advent of global suppliers resulted in the domestic 
suppliers upgrading their technologies, quality standards and capabilities. Second, 
the domestic suppliers began to adopt an export oriented production strategy to 
enable participation in global sourcing. Third, The more established vehicle 
assemblers such as the Tatas, the Birlas and Mahindra and Mahindra set up joint 
ventures with global suppliers to consolidate their supplier streams through improved 
productivity and technology. Fourth, the auto component industry expanded by over 
four times in production during the 90’s through the mushrooming of a number of 
firms. Fifth, the continuing restrictive legislation forced the new entrants to almost 
solely (95%) use domestic component suppliers. The localization thus forced the 
Indian suppliers to upgrade. Overall, while the restructuring modernised the auto-
industry it further strengthened the domestic linkages.  
iv
The origin of the ICT sector in India and its rapid growth are situated in the 
culmination of multiple factors during the 1980s and the early 1990s. These were a 
combination of global market forces, changing political ideologies and the growing 
numbers of skilled English speaking labour in the country.  The number of Indian 
software firms grew from just 38 in 1988 to over 545 in 1999 with employment figures 
rising from 90,000 to 250,000 in the same period (ibid, NASSCOM, 2002). The 
 and revenue. The capitals of these states – 
Bangalore, Chennai and Hyderabad have emerged as the major ICT centres in the 
country. Bangalore, referred to as the Silicon Valley of India has the largest 
concentration of software development firms with 100 domestic firms and over 75 
MNCs.  
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export revenue of the software industry has risen from $130 million in 1990 to almost 
$8 billion in 2001 (D'Costa, 2003;211). The rapid pace of expansion has led the 
World Bank to identify it as the model for exhibiting the potential of the private sector 
in India (World Bank, 2001; 6).   
 The ICT sector in India comprises three main sub-sectors. These are: the 
software industry – domesticv and exports, domestic computer maintenance services 
and business process outsourcing (BPO). The ICT sector as a whole represents 
2.87% of the country’s GDP while software exports make up over 16% of the total 
exports (NASSCOM, 2002). The National IT Task Force has set an annual export 
target of $50 billion and domestic target of $35 billion by 2008. The unique feature of 
the software industry is the dominance of the export oriented strategy. 65% of the 
total software revenue is generated through exports (Arora et. al, 2001). This is of 
particular significance given India’s tradition of restrictive and inward looking stance 
on industryvi
 The mushrooming of business process outsourcing (BPO) services in 
developing countries is the outcome of globalisation of the world economy 
(UNCTAD, 2003, D'Costa, 2002c, Correa, 1996). The opening of economies has 
facilitated the firms based in the US and Europe to not only tap into the pool of cheap 
skilled labour but also benefit from the much lower infrastructure costs (Gartner, 
2003)
.   
vii
 Briefly then, the ICT sector is highly technical skill-intensive and requires 
command over English
. India has succeeded to date in capturing 80% of the international 
outsourcing market (UNCTAD, 2003; 135). An English speaking skilled workforce 
and savings linked to lower wages are major factors contributing to the growth of 
BPO in India (D'Costa, 2002c, Joseph, 2002). The bulk of the BPO clients are from 
the US and over a quarter from Europe – mainly the United Kingdom (UNCTAD, 
2003; 138). The revenue from BPO in India in 2002 reached $2.3 billion (NASSCOM, 
2003). The current workforce of 100, 000 in the BPO industry in India is expected to 
increase over ten times to 1.1 million by 2008 (Wipro, 2003).  
viii
What implications does the expansion of FDI into the ICT sector and the 
automobile sector discussed above have for the country in terms of capital 
accumulation, poverty and human development? The FDI-sectoral linkages mapping 
discussed in section 2 is examined within the context of each state. The development 
contexts in each state are first discussed below through human development and the 
growth trajectories.  
. It is therefore located in urban pockets that are situated in 
areas of ‘regional advantage’ as noted by (Saxenian, 1994).   
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The southern Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka emerged as major 
participants in the liberalisation process implemented in 1991. Both states 
experienced economic growth rates of above 6 percent year on – consistently above 
the all India average in the last ten years (GoI, 2001, Gopal and Bhakri, 2005). The 
overall trends in poverty reduction in both states have been impressive in the same 
period. Karnataka saw a reduction in the proportion of urban population living below 
poverty line from 40 percent to under 25 percent. Tamil Nadu’s progress was 
marginally better with a reduction from 40 percent to under 23 percent urban 
population living below the poverty line. Both states experienced reductions in rural 
poverty as shown in Table 4.                                     
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
A close examination of the trends though raises some concerns.  Both states 
have higher levels of urban headcount index than rural headcount ratio though in 
terms of absolute numbers rural poor outnumber the urban poor. This is because of 
the higher proportion of rural population in each state.ix
Karnataka is one of India’s fastest growing states with a growth rate of its 
GSDP at 7.3 % in the first half of the 1990s increasing to 8.3 % in the second half the 
1990s. The state experienced growth in all three sectors of the economy – 
agricultural, industrial and service sectors grew at an average of 4.0%, 9.2% and 
 Notably the largest numbers 
of rural poor are those employed in agriculture. This conforms to the overall trend for 
the country where the overwhelming majority - 75% of the poor are rural of which 
80% - are dependent on agriculture (Deaton, 2001: 126; Datt and Ravallion, 2002:1; 
World Bank, 2001: 7, 9, 11, 35). The steep urbanisation trend in Tamil Nadu though 
is distinct from those for most other states and for the country on the whole. Tamil 
Nadu is more urbanised than any of the major states in India with 44 percent urban 
population as compared with the national average of 28 percent (GoI, 2005:44). The 
state’s urban focus is further illustrated in a higher proportion of workforce employed 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors combined than in the primary sector. The trend 
is again unique to the state. Traditionally one of the most industrial states, it 
represents 11% of the country’s GDP and 15% of the country’s exports (GoI, 2005). 
Tamil Nadu has the third highest HDI ranking amidst the fifteen major states, an 
overall literacy of 73% with urban literacy of 84% and rural of 65%. The infant 
mortality is the third lowest in the country though very little progress has been made 
in the post reform period. Furthermore the gap between the state with the lowest 
infant mortality of 11 in Kerala and Tamil Nadu at 49 remains substantial.   
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10.2 % respectively in the second half of the 1990s. This is above the all-India 
average for the same period at 3.6%, 5.0% and 8.7% respectively for the three 
sectors. The progress on poverty reduction is overall encouraging though the extent 
is contested when using different sources.  
Deaton and Dreze’s (2002) adjusted poverty estimates indicate a much 
higher level of rural headcount ratio of 30.7 % - a fall of 7.2 %. The official estimates 
are more optimistic putting the level at 16.9 % with a fall of 13.2 % for the same 
period. There is a large discrepancy in the urban poverty levels too though in the 
opposite direction. The official estimates put the urban headcount ratio at a much 
higher level – 24.6 % while Deaton and Dreze’s (ibid) estimate it at an impressive 
10.8 %.x
In short, the areas of concern regarding Tamil Nadu in particular are rural 
income poverty by both the Official and Deaton and Dreze estimates, and urban 
income poverty by the Official estimate in addition to 65% rural literacy and high 
infant mortality of 49. Interestingly, the three areas noted here are amongst the main 
components of the multidimensional framework of poverty (Sen, 1982, 1985, UNDP, 
1989, 1990, WDR, 1980). Karnataka, as pointed earlier provides strong grounds for 
contesting the linkages between high growth and poverty reduction. The state with 
the highest growth in the country of over 8% in recent years has two thirds of its 
population in the rural sector. Almost three fifths of its rural population is employed in 
agriculture and over 80% of this population lives below the poverty line. An important 
point to note here is the significantly higher poverty elasticity of economic growth in 
Tamil Nadu than in Karnataka. Over the ten year period 1991-2001, Tamil Nadu 
experienced a fall in headcount ratio (urban) by 2.8 percentage points for every one 
percent growth while the figures for Karnataka were 1.9 percentage points for every 
one percent of growth (calculated from Table 4). What role might the FDI led 
manufacturing sector in the state play in this trend? Linkages with the domestic 
human capital and the FDI in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are postulated in the next 
section. 
 What remains undisputed is that while there has been overall progress in 
poverty reduction, high levels of poverty continue to exist in the state. This is despite 
Karnataka experiencing the highest growth rate in the country in the latter part of the 
1990s. Furthermore, the state’s performance in the human development indicators at 
best exhibits an average trend in the country. The state of Karnataka therefore offers 
rich potential for re-visiting the discourse on growth and poverty reduction (Dollar and 
Kraay, 2002, Bhalla, 2003, Kanbur, 2002) as well as on pro-poor growth and poverty 
(Kakwani and Pernia, 2000, Baulch and McCullock, 2000, Ravallion, 2004, Kakwani, 
2004, Sumner, 2006).  
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[Insert table 5] 
 
4. FDI links with domestic human capital – a conceptual model for Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the states account for over a fifth of the 
country’s FDI though in different sectors.  What are the implications of FDI in the ICT 
(tertiary) sector for engaging with the domestic resources in Karnataka? What are the 
implications of FDI in the manufacturing (secondary) sector for engaging with the 
domestic resources in Tamil Nadu?  
The conceptual framework for such linkages discussed in section 2 is 
postulated for each of the above two configurations. The discussion looks beyond the 
FDI and employment generation relationship and attempts to focus on the types of 
connections with the domestic human capital. It will be argued that the higher the 
participation rate and level of engaging with the domestic workforce the better the 
dissipation of benefits. The assumption here is that productive engagement will spur 
the growth of the non-economic indicators of development such as infrastructure, 
education and health facilities. As noted in section 2, the direct benefits remain via 
the expansion of livelihood opportunities. Investment in the social sectors – 
education, health and infrastructure can be speculated to follow an economically 
active community.  The spill-overs from improved social sectors reach the wider 
population spurring the betterment of the overall human capital. Hence, wider the 
reach of the sectoral engagement with the domestic population, more widespread the 
benefits – both direct and indirect.   
 
Tertiary Sector: The tertiary sector in Karnataka comprises primarily the software 
development industry and the business process outsourcing (BPO) through the call 
centres. The software development industry is highly specialised employing a highly 
skilled work force. The technical workforce is trained at the country’s intensely 
competitive engineering institutions and colleges. In recent years the industry has 
attracted technically trained personnel with overseas qualifications. Figure 1 
illustrates a generic mapping of human capital in the ‘knowledge based’ ICT sector. 
The ICT sector comprises four categories of workers indicated as HCI, HCII, HCIII 
and HCIV. HCI represents workers with specialised technical training & computing 
degrees acquired at the seven Indian Institutes of Technologiesxi (IITs), top grade 
engineering colleges and good overseas degrees. HC II: managerial personnel with 
qualifications from Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs)xii, other well known 
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management institutes and good overseas degree. HC III: technically trained with 
degrees/diplomas in computer sciences from regional engineering colleges. HC IV: 
Graduates with English as the medium of education with good command and 
fluency. HCI and HCII are clusters of highly skilled personnel, who make up the small 
proportion of India’s elite labour in terms of skill and intellect. Such labour fetches 
one of the highest remuneration packages in the country and is considered to be one 
of the major drivers of the ICT growth propelling India as a global player (Joseph, 
2002; Arora et. al, 2001). At the current rates, India is expected to face a shortage of 
such labour by over half a million by 2010 (Decan Herald, 2006). HCIII qualify from 
the twenty National Institutes of Technology (NITs) in the country and numerous 
private sector institutions. Originally known as Regional Engineering Colleges 
(RECs), these were upgraded in 2002 by the Government of India in the line with the 
prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). These institutes are rated just next 
to the IITs in terms of student quality, research and placements. Located in every 
major state of India, the medium of instruction in all NIT's is English. The group 
represented by HCIV, are mostly graduates from urban universities where the 
medium of teaching is English.  
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
This group does not have technical education and commands a much lower 
remuneration package as compared with HCI and HCII. However, when compared 
with the overall domestic job market for the same category of graduates, HCIV 
commands significantly higher wages. The centrality of English as the language of 
transaction in the ICT sector coupled with the specialised nature of the skill 
requirements make the sector highly urban focussed and accessible to those with 
technical qualifications and fluency in English. With just a third of the population living 
in the urban sector in Karnatakaxiii, the very nature of the ICT sector makes its 
engagement with the rural labour force a feeble one. The direct benefits therefore 
remain limited to the urban technically qualified labour. Though, there is a tangible 
expansion of the low skilled jobs that emerge to service the work and domestic 
environments of the high skilled personnel in the tertiary sector. This can offer a 
partial explanation for the shift in the urban population from 30 percent to almost 34 
percent over a decade in Karnataka. While the issue of rural-urban migration is a 
complex one with multiple causative factors, the expanding opportunities for the 
unskilled rural labour in the urban sector is a strong determinant.  However, these 
are low paid jobs where often the workers are slum dwellers. The poor infrastructure 
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and access to public services such as health, sanitation and education make it 
difficult for such workers to move up the economic and social ladder.  
 In summary therefore, while the tertiary sector offers immense opportunities 
and high returns, its engagement with the domestic human capital is narrow – 
employing a specialised cluster of labour. The direct benefits for the semiskilled and 
unskilled workers that make up the majority of the work force remain small. For the 
overall economy though, the growth in the tertiary sector has been very positive on 
the following accounts. Firstly, the export – oriented stance of the sector and the 
nature of the high returns is largely attributed to India’s positive balance of payment 
(BoP) in recent yearsxiv
 
 (GoI, 2005). Secondly, the ICT revolution in the country has 
played a major role in productively employing its specialised labour. The number of 
Indian software firms grew from just 38 in 1988 to over 545 in 1999 with employment 
figures rising from 90,000 to 250,000 in the same period (NASSCOM, 2002). Prior to 
this expansion, a large proportion of such labour migrated to the Silicon Valley in the 
United States.  
Secondary Sector: FDI in the secondary (manufacturing) sector in Tamil Nadu is 
dominated by the auto-industry and the textile knitwear industry. The conceptual 
model to explore the implications of FDI in the manufacturing sector for engaging 
with the domestic human capital in Tamil Nadu considers the auto-industry only.  
This is because of the low FDI inflows into the textile sector as compared with the 
auto-industry sector such that between1991-2004 the textile sector received a mere 
1% of India’s cumulative FDI compared with 9% in the auto industry (GoI, 2005, 
Tewari, 2005).  
The auto-industry in Tamil Nadu is often referred to as the ‘Detroit of India’ as 
noted earlier. The unique features of the industry as discussed in section 3 are its 
deep-rooted linkages with the local supplier network. It continues to rely on a number 
of small local units.  
Figure 2 illustrates a generic mapping of human capital in the engineering 
based auto-industry sector. HC1 represents high skilled engineers with specialised 
technical training and qualifications acquired at the seven Indian Institutes of 
Technologies (IITs), top grade engineering colleges and good overseas degrees. 
HC2 comprises managerial personnel with qualifications from Indian Institutes of 
Management (IIMs), from other well-known management institutes and good 
overseas degree. HC3 represents the technically trained labour through vocational 
training and diplomas. This group can be classified as the intermediate skilled labour 
class.  
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[Insert figure 2] 
 
HC4 indicates the low skilled labour that would typically have secondary education 
and gained on the job training. Mapping these categories of human capital to the 
domestic facing supplier base of the industry comprising numerous small firms, the 
bulk of the labour employed would come under HC3 and HC4.  
The expansion in the small local suppliers units has direct implications for the 
employment of the locally trained diploma holders and vocational trained workers. 
The following factors offer some explanation for the rapid expansion of the supplier 
base in Tamil Nadu. First, there is a high concentration of such training institutions in 
the region, such that the largest proportion of the country’s engineering institutions – 
51% of degree level and 31% of diploma are located in the southern cluster of Tamil 
Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh (World Bank, 2000; 47). Second, Tamil Nadu 
has a long tradition of auto component production - India Pistons was established in 
1949 in collaboration with a British engineering group. Generations of domestic 
workers have been trained and employed by the auto-component industry in Tamil 
Nadu throughout India’s ISI policy framework. The entry of foreign assemblers 
spurred the competition, upgrading of skills and the expansion of the engineering 
colleges in the region. Furthermore, while the medium of training is English, the 
emphasis is on engineering skills as opposed to fluency in spoken and written 
English. This feature conceptually allows the sub-urban and the rural cohorts to seek 
the necessary training and find opportunities in the auto-industry. It can be argued 
then that the labour intake for the auto-industry is not limited to the urban clusters of 
the state. The nature of the skills requirement for the auto-industry thus facilitates the 
engagement of a wider section of the domestic human capital in the productive 
process. In addition, as with the tertiary sector, there is a tangible rise of the low 
skilled jobs that emerge to service the work and domestic environments of the high 
skilled personnel in the auto-industry. Also, as noted earlier, Tamil Nadu is more 
urbanised than any of the major states in India with 44 percent urban population as 
compared with the national average of 28 percent (GoI, 2005:44). The state’s urban 
focus is further illustrated in a higher proportion of workforce employed in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors than in the primary sector. 
 In summary, the secondary sector examined through the auto-industry in 
Tamil Nadu, presents a wide platform for productive engagement with different 
categories of labour.  It offers direct benefits to the semiskilled and unskilled workers 
who have the potential to be vocationally trained without the stringent linguistic and 
specialised structured training requirements. Therefore, while the secondary sector in 
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the country has grown much slower than the tertiary sector, its connections with the 
domestic human capital in regions where it has grown are wide and deep.  It offers 
the potential to enable a higher direct participation of the working population in the 
growth process. Other industries in the manufacturing sector such as the textile and 
apparel may even have a higher potential to engage a wider cohort of semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour. While this and most industries in the manufacturing sector in 
India receive small to negligible levels of FDI and continue to grow at a slow pace, 
the potential to engage a wider section of the population remains high.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter draws attention to the increasing FDI inflows and the impact on poverty 
reduction in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in India. Poverty reduction is explored via the 
level of domestic human capital engagement in the two states. A conceptual 
mapping model is presented to study the human capital engagement in different 
sectors. While there is overall progress, poverty trends in Tamil Nadu show high rural 
multidimensional poverty indicators as well as high urban income poverty. Karnataka 
presents strong grounds for contesting the linkages between high growth and poverty 
reduction.  
The two states together account for nearly a fifth of the FDI inflows to the 
country. In recent times, the states appear to be attracting TNCs in two distinct 
sectors. Karnataka’s FDI is focussed in the tertiary sector through software and the 
ICT industries. Tamil Nadu on the other hand is emerging as an attractive destination 
for TNCs in the manufacturing sector. Tamil Nadu indicates significantly higher 
poverty elasticity of economic growth than Karnataka.  
Karnataka is one of India’s fastest growing states with a growth rate of its 
GSDP at 7.3 % in the first half of the 1990s increasing to 8.3 % in the second half the 
1990s. The state experienced growth in all three sectors of the economy – 
agricultural, industrial and service sectors grew at an average of 4.0%, 9.2% and 
10.2 % respectively in the second half of the 1990s. This is above the all-India 
average for the same period at 3.6%, 5.0% and 8.7% respectively for the three 
sectors. While there has been overall progress in poverty reduction, high levels of 
poverty continue to exist in the state. Furthermore, the state’s performance in the 
human development indicators at best exhibits an average trend in the country. The 
state of Karnataka therefore offers rich potential for re-visiting the discourse on 
growth and poverty reduction as well as on pro-poor growth and poverty.  
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 The chapter has conceptually explored the productive engagement with the 
domestic human capital in the FDI driven tertiary sector in Karnataka and the 
secondary sector in Tamil Nadu. The rationale is that the higher the participation rate 
and level of engaging with the domestic workforce the better the dissipation of 
benefits. It is argued that while the tertiary sector offers immense opportunities and 
high returns, its engagement with the domestic human capital is narrow – employing 
a specialised cluster of labour. The direct benefits for the semiskilled and unskilled 
workers that make up the majority of the work force remain small.  
For the overall economy though, the growth in the tertiary sector has been 
very positive on the following accounts. Firstly, the export – oriented stance of the 
sector and the nature of the high returns is largely attributed to India’s positive 
balance of payment (BoP) in recent years. Secondly, the ICT revolution in the 
country has played a major role in productively employing its specialised labour.  
The secondary sector examined through the auto-industry in Tamil Nadu, 
presents a wide platform for productive engagement with different categories of 
labour.  It offers direct benefits to the semiskilled and unskilled workers who have the 
potential to be vocationally trained without the stringent linguistic and specialised 
structured training requirements. Therefore, while the secondary sector in the country 
has grown much slower than the tertiary sector, its connections in regions where it 
has grown with the domestic human capital are wide and deep.  It offers the potential 
to enable a higher direct participation of the working population in the growth 
process. 
In conclusion both states show poor progress on the non-income poverty 
indicators, especially in the rural sector. FDI in the tertiary and the secondary sectors 
has boosted the growth in both states. The rural poverty in particular though remains 
untouched by the FDI led growth in the states. While there has been progress in the 
overall poverty reduction, a direct linking of this to the growing FDI inflows seems 
unlikely but needs to be explored further.  FDI in the tertiary sector attracts a specific 
urban cohort of human capital while FDI in the manufacturing sector attracts a wider 
cohort of human capital.  It can be argued therefore that the FDI in the manufacturing 
sector enables a higher percentage of lower skilled cohort to participate in the 
productive process.  The assumption here is that productive engagement will spur 
the growth of the non-economic indicators of development such as infrastructure, 
education and health facilities. Further, the progress in the tertiary sector will 
continue to strengthen the knowledge capacities to remain globally competitive – an 
in valuable asset for the country. But, it is the manufacturing sector that can free 
large sections of poverty trapped populations in the short term.  To summaries – FDI 
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led growth itself has not reduced poverty, rural poverty in particular which remains 
high. The benefits of such growth remain via the livelihood opportunities for certain 
cohorts of population and engagement with the domestic resources.   
 
Refernces: 
 
Arora, A., Arunachalam, V.S., Asundi, J. and Fernandes, R. 2001. The Indian 
software services industry. Research Policy 30: 1267-1287. 
Bajpai, N. and Sacks, J.D. 2000. Foreign Direct Investment in India – Issues and 
Problems, Development Discussion Paper No 759, Harvard Institute for International 
Development, Harvard University, March 2000. 
Bajpai, N. 2002. A Decade of Economic Reforms in India: the Unfinished Agenda 
CID Working Paper No. 89, March 2002 
Balasubramanyam, V. N., Salisu, M. and Dapsoford, D.1999. Foreign direct 
investment as an engine of growth. Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development. 106: 92-105 
Bardhan, P. 2006. Globalisation and Rural Poverty, World Development, Vol. 34, No. 
8, pp. 1393-1404 
Baulch, R. and McCullock, N. 2000. Tracking pro-poor growth. ID21 insights No. 31. 
Sussex: Institute of Development Studies 
Bhalla, S. 2003. Imagine There’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in the 
Era of Globalisation. Institute for International Economics: Washington, DC. 
Carkovic, M. and Levine, R. 2002. Does foreign direct investment accelerate growth? 
Mimeograph. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Correa, C. M. 1996. Strategies for software exports from developing countries. World 
Development 24(1): 171-182. 
Chen, S. and Ravallion, M. 2004. How have the world’s poor poorest fared since the 
early 1980s? World Bank Observer, 19 (2):141-170 
Datt, G. and Ravallion, M., 2002. Is India’s economic growth leaving the poor 
behind?, Mimeograph, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
D'Costa, A. P. 2002. Software outsourcing and policy implications: An Indian 
Perspective. International Journal of Technology Management 25:3-4. 
D'Costa, A. P. 2003. Uneven and Combined Development: Understanding India's 
Software Exports. World Development 31(1): 211-226. 
Deaton, A. 2001. Computing prices and Poverty Rates in India, 1999-2000, 
Research Programme in Development Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.  
Deaton, A. and Dreze, J. 2002. Poverty and Inequality in India: a Re-examination. 
Economic and Political Weekly, September 7, pp. 3729-3748 
18 
Decan Herald, 2006 Econoomy and Business, February 27, 2006 
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2002) Growth is good for the poor, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 7:195-225. 
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2004).Trade, Growth and Poverty, Economic Journal, 
114(493), pp 22-49. 
Ganuza, E., Morley, S.,  Pineiro, V., Robinson, S. and Vos, R. (2005). Are Export 
Promotionand trade Liberalisation Good for Latin America’s Poor?, Development 
Policy Review, Vol 23, No. 3, pp. 385-403 
Gartner (2003). The economies of IT services and outsourcing in Europe. 
www.gartner.com/Init. 
Global Competitiveness Report (2005) 
GoI, (Government of India), Census of India, 2001 
GoI, (Government of India), (2001). National Human Development Report, Planning 
Commission, Government of India, New Delhi. 
GoI, (Government of India), (2002). Statistical Abstract of India, Central Statistical 
Organisation, New Delhi. 
GoI, (Government of India), (2005). Tamil Nadu Development Report, Planning 
Commission, GoI, New Delhi. 
Gopal, and Bhakri, S. (2005). Statistical data on Indian Economy, Taxmann 
Publishers, New Delhi. 
Hansen, M.W. (2004). Collaborations between Danish foreign investors and local 
industry in India. Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen.   
Hirshman, A.O. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University 
Press, New Haven, CT. 
Joseph, K.J. (2002). Growth of ICT and ICT for Development: Realities and Myths of 
the Indian Experience, United Nations University, World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (WIDER), Discussion paper 78, Helsinki.  
Kakwani, N. and Pernia, E. (2000). What is Pro-Poor Growth? Asian Development 
Review. 18(1):1-16 
Kakwani, N. (2004). New global poverty counts, International Poverty Centre, 
Working paper No. 3, UNDP 
Kamalakanthan, A. and Laurenceson, J. (2005). How important is foreign capital to 
growth in China and India, East Asia economic Research Group, Discussion paper 
No. 4, University of Queensland, Queensland. 
Kanbur, R. (2002). Trade and growth: the last redoubt, Mimeograph. University of 
Colombia. 
19 
Kanbur, R. (2004). Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Some Hard Questions. 
Mimeograph. Ithaca, Cornell University. 
Larsen, M.N., Yankson, P. and Fold, N. (2006). Restructuring and new linkages in 
the gold mining sector of Ghana, paper presented at the DSA-EADI TNC and MDP 
group symposium, 22-23 June, ODI, London. 
Lensink, R. and Morrissey, O. (2001). Foreign direct investment: Flows, volatility and 
growth. Paper prepared for Development Economics Study Group conference. 
University of Nottingham. April 5-7. 
Mellor, J.W., (1976). The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the 
Developing World, Cornell University Press.  
Milanovic, B. (2002) Can We Discern The Effect of Globalisation on Income 
Distribution? Mimeograph. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
National Association of Software Services Companies (NASSCOM), (2002). July 30. 
Statistics. www.nasscom.org 
National Association of Software Services Companies (NASSCOM), (2003). 
Nasscom strategic report, www.nasscom.org 
Okada, A. (2004). Skills Development and Interfirm Learning Linkages under 
Globalization: Lessons from the Indian Automobile Industry, World Development, 
Vol, 32, No. 7, pp. 1265-1288 
Ravallion, M and Datt, G. (2002). Why has economic growth been more pro-poor in 
some states of India than others, Journal Of Development Economics. 68, pp. 381-
400. 
Ravallion, M. and Chen, S. (2003). Measuring pro-poor growth. Economic Letters. 
78:93-99. http://elsevier.com/locate/econbase  
Ravallion, M. (2004). Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series No. 3242. World Bank, Washington DC. 
Sachs, J.D., Bajpai, N., Blaxill, M.F. and Maira, A. (2000). Foreign direct Investment 
in India, Centre for International Development, Harvard University  
Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage: Culture and competition in Silicon Valley 
and route 128. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
Sen (1982) 
Sen A. (1985). Well-being, agency and freedom: the Dewey lectures. Journal of 
Philosophy. 82(4): 169-221. 
Shand, R. and Bhide, S. (2001). Growth in India’s state economies before and with 
reforms: share and determinants, paper presented at the ASARC Conference on Ten 
Years of Economic reforms in India, The Australian National University, November 
19-20, 2001.  
20 
Siddharthan, N.S. (2006). Regional Differences in FDI Inflows: China – India 
Comparison, paper presented at the workshop on The Rapid Development of China 
and India: Domestic and International Consequences, Centre for International 
Management and Development Antwerp, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, 31 march-
April 1, 2006. 
Singh, N. and Srinivasan, T. N. (2004). Indian federalism, economic reform and 
globalization, UC Santa Cruz Centre for International Economics, Working Paper No. 
02-13. 
Soto, M. (2000). Capital flows and growth in developing countries: recent empirical 
evidence. Organisation of Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development 
Centre Technical Paper No. 160 Paris: OECD. 
Subramanian, S.(2005). Headcount Poverty Comparisons, International Poverty 
Centre, No. 18, UNDP  
Sumner, A. (2005). Is foreign direct investment good for the poor? A review and 
stocktake. Development in Practice, Vol 15, Nos 3/4. pp. 269-285 
Sumner, A. (2006). Economic and non-economic well-being: a review of progress on 
the meaning and measurement of poverty. In McGillivray. M. (ed.) Perspectives on 
Human Well-being. Oxford University Press for United Nations University: Oxford. 
Tewari, M. (2001). Engaging the New Global Interlocutors: Foreign Direct Investment 
and the Transformation of Tamil Nadu’s Automotive Supply Base, Centre for 
International Development, Harvard University.  
Tewari, M. (2005). Post-MFA Adjustments in India’s Textile and Apparel Industry: 
Emerging Issues and Trends, Working Paper No. 167, Indian Council for Research 
on International Economic Relations, New Delhi. 
UNCTAD (2003). E-Commerce and Development Report. United Nations, New York 
and Geneva. 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2005, United Nations, New York and Geneva 
UN (United Nations) 1989. Handbook on Social Indicators. UN: Geneva. 
UNDP 1997. Human Development Report. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
UNDP 1995. Human Development Report. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Winters, A.L. (2002). Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: What are the Links?, The 
World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 9 pp. 1339-1367. 
Wipro (2003). www.wipro.com/spectramind/why_bpo.htm. 
World Bank (2001). Country Assistance Strategy, India. World Bank, Washington 
D.C.  
World Bank (2001). India: Reducing Poverty, Accelerating Development, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi. 
21 
World Economic Forum, 2005 
www.indiastat.com 
22 
 
Table 1  FDI Flows for India and China, 2002-04, (US$m) 
 
Country 
FDI Inflows FDI Outflows 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
India 3, 449 4,269 5,335 6586 1,107 913 2,222 1364 
China 52,743 53, 505 60, 630 72,406 2,518 -152 1,805 11,305 
 Source: World Investment Report, 2005, 2006 
 
Table 2: FDI approvals % of gross capital formation 1991-2001 (average) 
High income states Middle-income states Low-income states 
Punjab 3.1 Kerala 1.9 Bihar 1.2 
Gujarat 8.2 Andhra Pradesh 9.4 Rajasthan 2.8 
Maharashtra 12.4 Karnataka 14.2 Uttar Pradesh 2.0 
Haryana 4.8 Tamil Nadu 13.1 Madhya Pradesh 1.9 
Delhi - West Bengal 9.5 Orissa 14.1 
Average 7.1  9.6  4.4 
Source: Singh and Srinivasan (2004) 
 
Table 3: Per capita FDI approvals 1991-2001 
 PCFDI FICCI FDI ranking 
Maharashtra 362.89 1 
Tamil Nadu 353.81 4 
Karnataka 346.47 2 
Orissa  216.90 - 
Gujarat 211.38 5 
Andhra Pradesh 146.89 3 
PCFDI: per capita FDI approvals in Rs ten million 
FICCI: Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Source: www.indiastat.com, FICCI FDI Survey, 2004 
 
Table 4: Poverty and Growth in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka 
 Tamil Nadu Karnataka 
 1991 2001 1991 2001 
GDSP annual growth rate* (%) 6.2 7.8 
% share in GDSP: Primary** 22.2 (52.4) 19.7 (41.9) 35.6 (66.4) 26.2 (58.4) 
 % share in GDSP: Secondary** 34.5 (18.1) 30.0 (20.1) 26.2 (10.6) 27.7 (11.5) 
% share in GDSP):Tertiary ** 43.3 (29.5) 50.4 (38.0) 38.2 (23.0) 46.2 (30.1) 
Infant mortality 54 49 74 58 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Population (in millions) 36.8 19.1 34.9 27.3 31.1 13.9 34.8 17.9 
Headcount Ratio 
Deaton and Dreze estimates (2002) 
Absolute numbers in million 
33.0  
38.5 
12.1 
39.9 
20.8 
7.6 
20.1 
24.3 
7.0 
22.5 
11.3 
6.1 
30.2 
37.9 
9.4 
39.8 
21.4 
5.5 
16.9 
30.7 
5.9 
24.6 
10.8 
4.4 
% BPL*** employed in agriculture 77.4 - 75.2 - 82.7 - 84.4 - 
Literacy rate (%) 41.8 67.2 65.0 84.0 47.7 74.2 59.3 80.6 
*1993-94-1999-00, **Figures in brackets give % distribution of workforce employed, *** BPL= below poverty line   
Source:  GoI, 2001, Deaton and Dreze, 2002      
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Table 5: Human Development in 15 major Indian states -2001 
 HDI ranking   Per capita 
NSDP1 
Urban 
population2  
Head count index 
Rural Urban 
Andhra Pradesh 10 9534 27.1 10.5 27.2 
Assam 14 5933 12.7 40.2 7.2 
Bihar 15 3294 10.5 44.0 33.5 
Gujarat 6 13,163 37.4 12.4 14.8 
Haryana 5 13, 681 29.0 7.4 10.0 
Karnataka 7 11,257 34.0 16.9 24.6 
Kerala 1 10, 141 26.0 9.4 20.0 
Madhya Pradesh 12 7520 27.0 37.2 38.6 
Maharashtra 4 14, 732 42.4 23.3 26.8 
Orissa 11 5206 15.0 47.8 43.5 
Punjab 2 14, 881 34.0 6.0 5.4 
Rajasthan 9 8466 23.4 13.4 19.4 
Tamil Nadu 3 12,315 43.9 20.1 22. 5 
Uttar Pradesh 13 5633 20.8 31.0 30.7 
West Bengal 8 9307 28.0 31.7 14.7 
All India   28.0 26.5 24.0 
11993-94 prices annual average for 1998-9 to 2000-1, 2 % of  total state population,  
Source: GoI, 2001 
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i Capital accounts remain restrictive while the agricultural sector remains completely closed to 
any forms of trade reforms.  
ii For a detailed discussion, see Sumner (2005).  
iii See Tewari (2001) for a detailed discussion on Tamil Nadu’s automotive industry. 
iv 36% of the ICT firms in the country are located in these three states and generate a 
revenue of 36% (NASSOM, 2003). 
v Domestic export revenue totalled $2.5 billion in 2001-02 (NASSCOM, 2002) 
vi Despite the opening up of the economy in the early 1990s, many sectors reflect the 
country’s long legacy of heavy regulation and protection (World Bank, 2001; 14). 
vii It is estimated that average salaries of IT workers in developing countries are lower by up to 
80% of comparable workers in developed countries (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 135). D’Costa (2003, 
p. 218) notes that Indian salaries in various IT services are between 7-40 percent of the US 
industry figures. Arora et al. (2001; 1275) indicate that one person-year onsite work is billed at 
about $90,000-$100,000 while comparable offshore work is billed at about $25,000-$35,000.  
viii In the absence of strong software development in the Indian dialects (Arora et al., 2001), 
English is used as a medium to operate the ICT sector in India.  
ix The use of headcount ratio and aggregate headcount to measure poverty levels often 
reveal conflicting information as also pointed by Subramanian (2005).  
x Karnataka along with Andhra Pradesh are the only two states where the discrepancy 
between the official method and Deaton and Dreze (2002) is close to 15 percentage points. 
The choice of the data source therefore has far reaching policy implications. Such differences 
will benefit from the much-needed fieldwork to validate the findings.  
xi The seven Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) are the country’s premier institutions of 
science in technology. Set up during the 1950s and 1960s with foreign collaboration, they 
feature in the top ten global institutions for science and technology. Currently, under 2000 
graduates are trained annually.  
xii The five Indian Institutes of Management (IIM) are India’s premier instutions on 
management. These were established in the mid 1960s. Like the IITs, the IIMs too feature 
high in the global ranking for social science institutions.  
xiii The national figure is 28 % urban and 72 % rural (GoI, 2001) 
xivIndia’s balance of payment (BoP) in the the fiscal year 2003-04 experienced a steep 
positive growth of 85.04 percent year-on-year basis . In terms of US$ the balance of 
payments stood at US$ 31.42 billion compared with US$ 16.98 billion in the previous fiscal 
year (GoI, 2005). 
